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*365  I. Introduction: Hold-up, hold-out and FRAND disputes
Technical standardisation is an omnipresent part of modern life, as experienced by anyone who uses a smartphone. To
a certain extent, this success comes as a surprise—does not standardisation imply competitors sharing, in a standard-
setting organisation (SSO), precious know-how and business secrets? And do not these competitors constitute, in
doing so, some form of cartel, requiring the attention of competition watchdogs? True, but market participants and
competition authorities have accepted, even fostered, standard-setting nonetheless because of its beneficial effects 1 : inter
alia, standardisation ensures interoperability of standard-based products, it renders these products more comparable for
consumers and it can help to select the "best" available technical solution for a given task.
However, these benefits come at the price of considerable risks. Among them are harmful interactions between standards
and intellectual property rights, such as "hold-up" and "hold-out" situations. In a prototypical hold-up situation, the
owner of a patent on part of a standard (standard-essential patent — SEP) imposes excessive, non-FRAND 2  licensing
conditions 3  on standard users. The mechanism that enables him to do so is the "lock-in" that often occurs once the
standard is implemented: market participants have invested in adapting their production or other business activities to
the standard and these investments would be lost as sunk costs if the standard-based activity were given up. 4  Even worse,
such renegade players might be forced to leave the respective market as and if consumers prefer standard-compliant
products. This can, in particular, occur where strong "network effects" are present, i.e. where the value of the respective
product or technology increases with the number of other persons using it. 5  Telecommunication standards are a very
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good example for such effects: they allow handhelds to interact, become ever more valuable with the increasing number
of people interconnected by way of this shared technological basis and, hence, tend to decrease the attractiveness of
non-standard-compliant devices. Of course, IP-encumbered standards could theoretically be replaced by other, non-
encumbered ones. Alternative standard-setting can be an effortful exercise, though. Entire markets may be slow to move
from one standard to another and relevant alternative technology that is not in its turn subject to intellectual property
rights may be hard to identify. All in all, lock-in can yield a powerful position to the SEP owner. It can allow him to "hold
hostage" standard users, threatening to prohibit their use of his protected technology and even to force their market exit
if they do not comply with the licensing conditions he defines. The intuitive concerns evoked by this scenario are justified
in principle. With his excessive royalty demands an IP owner engaged in hold-up appropriates (part of) the value of the
standard while the rationale of IP protection seems to entitle him only to the economic value of his protected invention. 6
By setting his licensing requirements selectively he may inflict particular harm on some standard users, for instance
because they are his competitors in the market for standard-based devices. Ultimately, the risk of such conduct may
deter market participants from implementing standards and tapping their beneficial potential in the future. Standard-
setting organisations can—and do—try to prevent hold-up, for instance by requiring SEP owners to commit to licensing
their IP on FRAND conditions. 7  Past cases have shown, however, that such precautions may be circumvented where,
for example, the IP owner stays away from the SSO in the first place 8  or transfers his SEPs to an entity that has, itself,
never made a FRAND commitment. *366  9
Considering all this, hold-up jeopardises the beneficial effects of standardisation. This is not to mean, however, that
the "bad guys" are always the IP owners. In a so-called "hold-out" a market participant uses the standard, and hence
the standard-essential patent, without taking a licence at all or without honouring FRAND-conditions. In intellectual
property law theory the SEP owner can, of course, halt such conduct by way of an injunction and remedy its effects by
claiming damages. 10  In practice, though, reluctance of courts to grant injunctions based on SEPs or the sheer amount
of resources required to enforce them across the board may shield the non-compliant standard user. As a result, the
standard user free-rides on the innovative effort made by the SEP owner, frustrates the incentivising rationale of IP
protection and, ultimately, deters IP owners from making their technologies available for future standardisation.
Statistical data indicate that risks such as hold-up and hold-out are not merely theoretical but result in profuse litigation
activity regarding SEPs. 11  The "smartphone wars" have made this evident to a broader public. As a rough—and non-
exhaustive 12 —classification one may distinguish three main types of cases: In the "ambush cases" like Rambus the owner
does not declare his patent, avoids making a FRAND commitment, waits until the standard is implemented and then
attempts to exploit hold-up by demanding non-FRAND licensing conditions. 13  In the typical "portfolio transfer cases"
like IPCom, 14  the initial SEP owner made a FRAND commitment. Thereafter, though, he transfers his SEP portfolio
to an acquirer that does not honour this commitment but tries to hold-up standard implementers. 15  In the "FRAND
dispute" cases the SEP owner has declared the patent, made a FRAND commitment and no "suspicious" conduct
(ambush, portfolio transfer, etc.) is present. However, SEP owner and standard implementer(s) end up quarrelling over
what "FRAND" conditions are in the particular case. 16  Here, the hold-up/hold-out antonymy is typically at full blossom
as the standard implementer denounces the patent holder’s licensing proposal to be non-FRAND while the latter blames
the standard implementer for engaging in delaying tactics.
At present, FRAND disputes are the most prominent subset of cases and, arguably, the decision which the European
Court of Justice (ECJ) handed down in Huawei is so far the most important one on the matter in Europe. Far from
answering all relevant questions, however, the ruling did in fact provoke some new ones. After analysing the background
and core statements of Huawei (below, II.) this contribution aims at sketching (below, III.) some of the most important
issues which are now to be discussed and resolved.
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II. The Huawei case
1. Facts of the case
The companies Huawei and ZTE, both of them Chinese, are powerful players in the telecommunications sector and
rivals on the Chinese as well as on the European markets. 17  Huawei declared a number of its patents to be essential
to ETSI’s 4G/LTE standard and made a commitment to license them on FRAND terms. As ZTE markets products
based on the 4G/LTE standard the parties engaged in licensing negotiations but could not reach an agreement. In
particular, ZTE proposed a cross-licensing arrangement instead of royalty payments but Huawei turned this down—
some say because it considered as quite weak the SEP portfolio that ZTE would have contributed to the cross-licensing.
Since negotiations had failed and ZTE continued to—allegedly—use Huawei’s SEPs without paying royalties, Huawei
brought an action for infringement against ZTE before the Düsseldorf Regional Court (Landgericht Düsseldorf), seeking
an injunction prohibiting the infringement, the rendering of accounts, the recall of products and an award of damages.
The court, however, perceiving a potential contradiction between the positions of the German Federal Court of Justice
(Bundesgerichtshof) and the European Commission, stayed the proceedings and referred a number of questions to the
ECJ. Essentially, the court wanted to know whether and under which circumstances a SEP holder who has made a
FRAND commitment violates art.102 TFEU by bringing an action for injunction against a standard user who is, in
principle, willing to take a licence. *367
2. Previous case law
(a) Orange Book
In the conflicting lines of case law that caused the Düsseldorf Court to address the ECJ, one pole is constituted by the
German Federal Court of Justice’s ruling in Orange-Book-Standard 18  and the ensuing line of cases. Regarding a de
facto-standard (not a de jure-standard, as in Huawei/ZTE), it was held in Orange Book that the SEP holder’s seeking
of an injunction against a standard user constitutes an abuse only in certain circumstances. In particular, the defendant
was required to have made the applicant an "unconditional" offer to conclude a licensing agreement, it being understood
that the defendant must consider itself bound by that offer and that the applicant is obliged to accept it where its refusal
would unfairly impede the defendant or infringe the principle of non-discrimination. Furthermore, where the defendant
uses the teachings of the patent before the applicant accepts such an offer, it must comply with the obligations under the
future licensing agreement, namely to account for acts of use and to pay the sums resulting therefrom.
The Orange Book decision has been heavily—and justly—criticised, mainly for being too hard on the standard user. 19
Not only does the standard user bear the burden of specifying and offering licensing conditions. These conditions
must also—up front, without leaving the standard user some room for negotiation—meet the SEP owner’s interests
to an extent that the latter cannot refuse them without committing an abuse. 20  Moreover, the standard user must
immediately start to fulfil these conditions, in particular to render account and to pay or deposit royalties, without
even knowing what the prospective licensing agreement will exactly look like. It is less clear whether the Federal Court,
when requiring an "unconditional" offer, intended an exclusion of the standard user’s right to challenge validity or
infringement of the alleged SEP. 21  The lower courts at least answered in the affirmative, 22  which not only adds another,
and very significant, layer to the standard user’s burden. If the SEP owner can impose licensing conditions that prohibit
challenging validity or infringement, the "purifying" benefit of such challenges to the patent system is also at risk.
Assuming that all standard users have to take such a licence or abstain from using the standard, who will remain to attack
weak SEPs? Other SEP holders are not very likely to be the assailants since they are either using the standard themselves
and, hence, bound by a no challenge-clause, or at least they would have to fear fierce counter-attack for jeopardising the
"no challenge-peace" so advantageous to all SEP holders.
The ECJ rules on standard-essential patents: thoughts and..., E.C.L.R. 2016, 37(9),...
 © 2016 Thomson Reuters. 4
(b) The Commission’s position
While the Orange Book approach favours, as seen, the SEP holder, the EU Commission’s position in its investigations
against Motorola and Samsung rather rests at the other end of the spectrum. In two press releases concerning these
cases 23  the Commission considered an action for injunction as a violation of art.102 TFEU where the SEP holder had
made a FRAND commitment and the standard user was willing to negotiate a licence. No qualifications were made
with regard to the degree of "willingness" that the standard user must show. Complementarily to the criticism levelled
against Orange Book, scholars 24 —and arguably also the Düsseldorf Regional Court 25 —have found fault with the
Commission’s approach because they considered it to favour hold-out. In fact, unspecific "willingness" is a very low
threshold that may allow the standard user to avoid paying royalties by prolonging or frustrating licensing negotiations.
3. The ECJ’s ruling
The ECJ commences by stating that its fundamental aim is to strike a balance between maintaining free competition and
the requirement to safeguard intellectual-property rights and their effective judicial protection, guaranteed by art.17(2)
and art.47 of the Charter, respectively. 26
The first requirement of art.102 TFEU— dominance—is not assessed by the court because it had not been contested in
the main proceedings. 27  With regard to the abuse-requirement the ECJ starts off by citing its well-known Hoffmann-
La Roche formula: abuse is the
"conduct of a dominant undertaking that, on a market where the degree of competition is already weakened precisely
because of the presence of the undertaking concerned, through recourse to methods different from those governing
normal competition in products or services on the basis of the transactions of commercial operators, has the effect of
hindering the maintenance of the degree of competition still existing in the market or the growth of that competition".
*368  28
Reference is then made to another element of settled case law, namely that the exercise of an exclusive intellectual
property right, even if it is the act of an undertaking holding a dominant position, cannot in itself constitute an abuse
of a dominant position. 29  In "exceptional circumstances", however, this assessment may change and the exercise of the
exclusive right may violate art.102 TFEU. 30
Comparing the case at hand to the existing case law on the (ab)use of IP rights the ECJ identifies the standardisation
context and the FRAND commitment as the core particularities in Huawei/ZTE 31 : the standard-essential nature of
the patent renders its use indispensable to all competitors that envisage manufacturing products that comply with the
standard. Hence, by bringing an action for prohibitory injunction the SEP holder can prevent products manufactured by
competitors from appearing or remaining on the market and, thereby, reserve to itself the manufacture of the products
in question. From the FRAND commitment the ECJ derives a legitimate expectation on the part of standard users that
a FRAND licence will in fact be granted. In consequence, a refusal to grant such a licence may, in principle, constitute a
violation of art.102 TFEU and this violation may be raised, by the standard user, as a defence to actions for a prohibitory
injunction.
This rule of law being established, the court underlines that, in the case at hand, the SEP holder Huawei is, in principle,
ready to grant a FRAND licence. The parties do not agree, however, on what constitutes FRAND in the circumstances
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of the case. 32  In such situations the ECJ requires both parties to show a conduct that ensures a fair balance between
their interests.
In favour of the SEP holder due account must be taken of his rights to enforce intellectual-property rights, covered
by, inter alia, Directive 2004/48 and the underlying art.17(2) of the Charter. While these acts aim at a high level of
protection for intellectual property rights, the SEP holder’s right to effective judicial protection is guaranteed by art.47
of the Charter 33 :
"This need for a high level of protection for intellectual-property rights means that, in principle, the proprietor may not
be deprived of the right to have recourse to legal proceedings to ensure effective enforcement of his exclusive rights, and
that, in principle, the user of those rights, if he is not the proprietor, is required to obtain a licence prior to any use". 34
On the other hand, the FRAND commitment weighs in favour of the standard users and obliges the SEP holder to
comply with specific requirements when bringing actions for a prohibitory injunction or for the recall of products against
alleged infringers. 35  More specifically, the SEP holder may not bring such actions without prior notice to or consultation
with the alleged infringer, even if the SEP has already been used by the alleged infringer. The notice must alert the
alleged infringer of the infringement complained about by designating the SEP and specifying the way in which it has
been infringed. This appears necessary to the Court because, in view of the typically large number of SEPs composing
a standard, it is not certain that the standard user is aware of its infringement.
Secondly, after the alleged infringer has expressed its willingness to take a licence, it is for the SEP holder to make a
specific, written offer for a licence on FRAND terms, in accordance with the undertaking given to the standardisation
body, specifying, in particular, the amount of the royalty and the way in which that royalty is to be calculated. In
the absence of a public standard licensing agreement, and where licensing agreements already concluded with other
competitors are not made public, the proprietor of the SEP is—according to the ECJ—better placed to check whether
its offer complies with the condition of non-discrimination than is the alleged infringer.
The standard user, in its turn, must diligently respond to the SEP holder’s offer, in accordance with recognised
commercial practices in the field and in good faith. 36  This level of conduct must be established on the basis of objective
factors and implies, in particular, that there are no delaying tactics. Should the alleged infringer not accept the licensing
offer, it may rely on the abusive nature of an action brought by the SEP holder only if it has submitted, promptly and in
writing, a specific counter-offer that corresponds to FRAND terms. Furthermore, where the alleged infringer is using
the SEP before a licensing agreement has been concluded, he must, from the point at which its counter-offer is rejected,
provide appropriate security, for example by providing a bank guarantee or by placing the amounts necessary on deposit.
The calculation of that security must include, inter alia, the number of the past acts of use of the SEP, and the alleged
infringer must be able to render an account in respect of those acts of use.
Where no agreement is reached on the details of the FRAND terms following the counter-offer by the alleged infringer,
the parties may, by common agreement, request that the amount of the royalty be determined by an independent third
party, by decision without delay. 37
With regard to validity/infringement-challenging the ECJ points to the fact that ETSI does not check whether patents
are valid or essential to the standard. Referring *369  further to the standard user’s right to effective judicial protection
guaranteed by art.47 of the Charter, the Court states—somewhat hazy—that a standard user "cannot be criticized" for
challenging the SEP in parallel to the negotiations or for reserving the right to do so in the future. 38
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Finally, the ECJ makes a very important distinction between actions for injunction or recall of products and actions for
rendering of accounts and/or damages 39 :
"Article 102 TFEU must be interpreted as not prohibiting, in circumstances such as those in the main proceedings, an
undertaking in a dominant position and holding an SEP, which has given an undertaking to the standardisation body
to grant licences for that SEP on FRAND terms, from bringing an action for infringement against the alleged infringer
of its SEP and seeking the rendering of accounts in relation to past acts of use of that SEP or an award of damages in
respect of those acts of use".
III. Follow-on case law
The few court decisions handed down since Huawei are—maybe somewhat surprisingly—not particularly favourable to
standard implementers. On the contrary, implementers have repeatedly, 40  though not always, 41  been held to violate
their conduct requirements under the Huawei standard.
Among the rulings is a particularly long and interesting one from the Regional Court in Mannheim. 42  The court granted
injunction for violation of a patent that had been declared essential to an ETSI standard by the International Patent
Evaluation Consortium (IPEC) and is now held by a patent assertion entity. Although the patent had not been flagged
to ETSI during the standard-setting process a patent ambush had, according to the court, not occurred because the
defendants (a number of companies vertically related in the production and marketing of standard-based devices) could
not prove that the company proposing the technology had knowledge of the patent application at the time the proposal
was made. Nor was the previous patent owner held to have breached a duty to disclose—be it personally or by using the
proposing standardisation participant as a bona fide agent—since he became an ETSI member only after the standard
was set. The present patentee and plaintiff was never a member of ETSI. Leaving open the questions whether the SEP
conferred market dominance to the plaintiff 43  and whether the present patentee/plaintiff was bound by the previous
patentee’s FRAND commitment, the court rejected the claim to a compulsory licence based on art.102 TFEU, s.19 of the
German Act Against Restraints of Competition and the Huawei principles because it considered the defendants unwilling
licensees. The plaintiff had informed one of the defendants about the purported infringement only after filing the lawsuit,
though before the statement of claims was served, which the court considered as potentially belated and therefore in
violation of the Huawei principles. However, within one year after the bringing of the lawsuit the defendant had never
declared their willingness to take a licence at all. A second defendant was informed when the lawsuit (to which he was not
initially a party) was already underway but only declared a—rather vague—willingness to license more than three months
after receiving the information, a period which the court considered to be excessive. In addition, this second defendant
never submitted a specific licensing offer as required by the Huawei principles. In particular, communications made by the
defendants only contained the proposal to have royalties determined by a third party or royalty figures intended to serve
as a basis for further discussions but no unambiguous, binding offer to pay a particular royalty. Given this unsatisfactory
conduct of the defendants, which further included failure to provide sufficient financial security for royalties potentially
due, the court considered it irrelevant whether the royalty claimed by the plaintiff was above FRAND level or whether
FRAND was violated by the fact that the defendants were requested to take a worldwide licence although the plaintiff
may not have been the owner of the entire (worldwide) patent family covering the invention. Interestingly, the court also
mentioned that enforcing an SEP while not abiding by the Huawei principles might violate art.101 TFEU as well, but it
denied such violation on the same grounds as with regard to art.102 TFEU. In a preliminary ruling concerning the same
lawsuit, the Karlsruhe Court of Appeal had deemed it a potential violation of art.102 TFEU/s.19 Act Against Restraints
of Competition if producers of standard-implementing devices are willing to take a licence while their retail partner is
not and the SEP holder, who usually enters into licensing agreements with the producers instead of the retailers, goes
after the retail partner in order to put pressure on the producers. 44
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In another important post-Huawei ruling the Regional Court of Düsseldorf also expressed doubts whether an SEP holder
complied with the Huawei requirements by informing the implementer of the alleged infringement only at the time of
and/or by way of the bringing of a *370  lawsuit. 45  However, since the lawsuit had been commenced before the Huawei
ruling the court considered the SEP owner to be in line with the case law relevant at that time. As to the implementer’s
duty to react to a licensing offer made by the SEP owner the court held that a reply is due regardless of whether the SEP
holder’s offer is FRAND or not. 46  As soon as the implementer’s first 47  counter-offer has been rejected, and regardless
of whether the SEP holder’s initial offer was FRAND or not, the implementer is—according to the Düsseldorf Regional
Court—obliged to render account and to provide appropriate security. Since the implementer at issue did not fulfill this
requirement, the court granted injunction and damages. The Düsseldorf Upper Regional Court, however, has stayed
the provisional enforceability of the Regional Court’s ruling until decision upon the pending appeal. 48  In essence, the
Upper Regional Court held that the implementer is obliged to react to the SEP holder’s offer only if this initial offer is
FRAND. Since the Regional Court had left this issue open—assuming a duty to react in any case—the appellate court
considered it unclear whether the implementer had violated its duties under the Huawei rules and, hence, whether the
SEP holder was entitled to damages and an injunction.
IV. Selected issues post-Huawei
1. A bred-in-the-bone antitrust ruling?
A first issue relates to the prominence that the decision attributes to legal concepts not genuinely stemming from
competition law. While in decisions like Magill, IMS Health or Microsoft, art.102 TFEU and its interaction with the
respective rules on IP protection formed the core of the ECJ’s argumentation, the Articles of the Charter 49  and general
civil law notions of fairness (good faith, recognised commercial practices) do now provide an important part of the basis
for conduct requirements imposed on the parties. In fact, no theory of competitive harm is properly established and
competition law paradigms like exclusion or exploitation are not even extensively discussed. In a way, the Charter-based
balancing which the Court undertakes seems to form a new Archimedean point for legal reasoning.
This new streak in the EU law-framework for the protection and interaction of intellectual property and competition
has at least four potential implications: First, and unfortunately, it blurs somewhat the view on the interaction of IP
protection and competition law. When the Court talks of "strik[ing] a balance between maintaining free competition
[…]and the requirement to safeguard that proprietor’s intellectual-property rights […] guaranteed by Article 17(2)
[…] of the Charter" this sounds like competition and IP protection were conflictive principles in need of cautious
reconciliation—rather the opposite is true: IP rights need competition to yield returns and they are intended to fuel, by
their very blocking of imitation, competition by substitution as well as competition based on follow-on innovations. 50
Furthermore, the cited passage seems to stress that the protection granted by IP rights is fixed in scope, preordained
by rules as fundamental as the Charter and the very concept of "property". From a policy perspective this narrative is
dangerous. True, once an individual IP right has been granted it cannot be materially curtailed or withdrawn without
having regard to notions of property protection. 51  As an abstract legal concept, though, intellectual property rights
can be, must be, and are shaped to a large extent by the purpose they ought to serve. 52  The legislator has (mainly) 53
established them as a means to foster dynamic efficiency in the market and he is, in tailoring them to this purpose, little
confined by a natural law-concept of (intellectual) "property".
Secondly and on a more practical note, the Charter—binding for all Member States—provides additional grounds for
a primacy of EU law over national rules on IP protection. In the future, exclusive rights granted by Member States to
an IP holder may be curbed not mainly because their exercise violates EU competition law but increasingly because they
are at odds with the Charter. For the charter to be applied, a particular case must of course be subject to EU law. Article
102 TFEU is, however, not the only candidate for bringing about this applicability. The EU Enforcement Directive, for
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instance, which the Huawei decision cites but does not really apply, 54  calls for "fair, equitable" and "proportionate"
remedies 55  and this terms might be interpreted in the light of the Charter.
This assumption leads to a third suggestion, concerning the relationship between the rules of conduct outlined in Huawei
and the market dominance requirement of art.102 TFEU. In its ruling the ECJ draws a picture of fair interaction between
particular participants in a *371  standard-based market. Such fairness is desirable regardless of the existence of market
power and even regardless of the degree of hold-up exercised by the SEP holder. Furthermore, as far as the standard user
(and alleged patent infringer) is concerned, the rules of conduct do typically not address a dominant undertaking. Of
course, art.102 TFEU provides a legal basis for establishing conduct requirements and sanctioning their violation only
if market dominance is present. But the articles of the Charter and the concept of fairness do not depend on dominance;
hence requirements based on them may apply to all market participants. 56  In this perspective, art.102 TFEU forms more
of an additional, dominance-dependent sanction for the violation of a broadly applicable standard of fairness. In its
ruling the ECJ was not forced to detail on SEP-based market dominance—nonetheless it fits well into the aforedescribed
concept that he chose not to do so. 57  In sum, Huawei/ZTE is rooted much less in genuine competition law than some
might have expected—or hoped.
The fourth observation is a direct consequence of the third: to the extent competition law looms less large there is more
room for other legal concepts to order the field of standardisation. The terms "good faith" and "recognized commercial
practices" do, in particular, sound a contractual note. In German law, the contractual road has been blocked mainly by
unfortunate court rulings which refused to interpret the FRAND commitment as a third-party beneficial contract. 58
In the US, on the other hand, contract rules are applied 59  and they may—in the presence of a FRAND commitment
—prove helpful to EU cases as well. Before a contractual solution can take full effect, however, a number of issues
have to be solved, such as the determination of the law applicable to a "FRAND-based third party beneficial contract"
established in the framework of a particular SSO. 60
2. FRAND addiction and the "EU eBay rule"
The ECJ had to decide on a case in which a FRAND commitment had not only been made but formed the centre of the
dispute. Unsurprising as it therefore was that the Huawei ruling based itself very much on the commitment, it may worsen
a profound weakness in the present discourse on SEP cases: as said before, most of the discussion focuses on the FRAND
commitment and most approaches for coping with these cases depend on it. But what to do if the FRAND holder has not
made such a commitment, 61  for instance because he did not partake in the standard-setting but acquired the portfolio
afterwards? 62  FRAND-based (contractual) approaches are then probably unable to provide conduct requirements for
either the SEP holder or the standard implementer. Competition law, however, is still in a position to check hold-up and
hold-out, 63  while patent law must—and should—still be enabled to do so. 64
Contractual approaches can easily fail then but competition or—preferably—patent law may still be in a position to
check both hold-up and hold-out.
In comparison, the US approach seems more resilient and more flexible, which however also means that it provides less
legal certainty. The eBay criteria for barring injunctions do not absolutely require a FRAND commitment, although
its existence does of course loom large in the assessment of these criteria. 65  Even with a commitment, the eBay-based
US approach and the Huawei-test may turn out differently when applied to the same facts. In Apple v Motorola, for
instance, Apple seems not to have made a specific counter-offer. 66  This would call into question its "willingness" in the
sense of Huawei while it did not keep Judge Posner from refusing an injunction to Motorola.
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3. A stack of open questions
The Huawei/ZTE ruling goes beyond general remarks on a "middle path" 67  between the interests of SEP holders and
standard users. It starts to carve that path with a roadmap for how they should resolve their conflicts. Unavoidably,
though, many important questions remain yet to be answered. Among them are not only the issues of portfolio licensing
and no-challenge clauses, to be discussed in separate sections of this study, but also numerous other aspects. A selection
of issues are touched upon in the following: *372
 
Relationship between "FRAND", "willingness", "good faith" and "recognized commercial practices":
The exact relationship between the multiple legal concepts with which Huawei operates still needs to be worked out. 68
Does FRAND go more to the content of the licensing offer while the standards of good faith and recognised commercial
practice rather address the process of licensing negotiations? Or does the FRAND concept encompass these fundamental
concepts of fair dealing?
 
Working out the detailed licensing conditions to be offered or counter-offered:
The SEP holder may have a better knowledge of the number and content of his SEPs. But does he know enough about the
business model (products, turnover, calculation, etc.) of each standard user to discern what FRAND conditions might
be with regard to that particular licensee? 69  And does a standard user, especially if he is a "little guy", have a picture
of the market that is clear enough for him to specify a FRAND counter-offer apt to shield him from injunction? If the
implementer lacks this capacity, how shall he determine the appropriate size of the security he is required to provide
in case of use without licence? 70  Courts, enjoying the benefit of hindsight with regard to FRAND licensing conditions
they might determine themselves, should not be overly strict if the reasonable and serious attempts of the parties prove,
in their result, not to exactly meet the FRAND margin. On the other hand they should severely sanction parties who do
not make their best effort in drafting FRAND-compliant offers, for instance by remaining vague on the details of the
envisaged licence or by formulating a mere basis for further negotiations instead of a binding offer.
 
FRAND as a range:
We believe that "FRAND" constitutes—in most cases—a certain range of conditions, rather than one single,
undisputable set of them. 71  The ECJ is, apparently, of the same opinion, since it envisages FRAND offers from both
the SEP holder and the standard implementer. If this is so, who gets to pick the conditions if the (counter-)offers of both
parties are located within that range? An argument that the SEP holder enjoys priority because the implementer is, after
all, infringing on his intellectual property 72  can hardly be convincing since the FRAND commitment has invited, as it
were, the implementer to use the patented and standardised technology. A negotiated compromise is, of course, the best
solution 73  but, ultimately, the law cannot force the parties to reach consensus. Independent determination of FRAND
licensing conditions must step in where consensus fails to materialise. 74  A transparent practice of royalty determination
by courts and arbitration tribunals can, in any case, help to induce consensus because parties who foresee what they will
get in court have an incentive to reach the same result out of court, thereby saving fruitless litigation costs. Furthermore
it should be permitted that—as is typical for complex negotiations—at least the initial offers of the parties may be located
rather at the outer ends of the FRAND range in order to create room for manoeuvre in the negotiating process.
 
FRAND violations in the process of negotiation:
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Opposite to the scenario just described, it may happen that neither party submits conditions that qualify as FRAND.
What are the consequences regarding the seeking of an injunction and the (further) implementation of the standard? The
Mannheim court has practically released the patentee from the duty to submit an offer that is truly FRAND in case of
an implementer’s blatant unwillingness to license. This is a slippery slope, however, since it may incentivise patentees
to submit pro forma offers, hoping to establish unwillingness of an implementer and to then force through high royalty
rates by way of filing for injunction. This concern *373  is especially warranted where the time-frame for an implementer
to show willingness is designed narrowly—as is the case for the three-month period envisaged by the Mannheim court.
In any case, the court erred, we think, in permitting the patentee to file for injunction before even informing the
implementer of a purported infringement. 75  Facing an unwilling implementer or not, the patentee should not be
permitted to jump the gun by suing first and—maybe—negotiating later. This is because (to state only one reason)
licensing negotiations which are overshadowed by ongoing litigation are affected by the imminent thread of injunction
as well as by litigation tactics and therefore unlikely to yield an undistorted result.
The Düsseldorf courts, in particular, are struggling at present with the effects of a non-FRAND offer submitted by either
party on the Huawei-obligations of the other party: Must the implementer make a counter-offer—or react at all—if the
initial offer by the SEP holder is not FRAND? 76  And is the SEP holder required to submit a FRAND offer although
the implementer declares he will accept no other than his own licensing conditions which are not FRAND? 77  What
seems most important in such settings is to not give the parties an option for blocking or escaping from negotiations by
pointing fingers at the bad, "non-FRAND guy" on the other side of the table. Furthermore, since nobody knows the
exact FRAND level of licensing conditions in a particular case, who is to judge whether a licensing offer is so blatantly
non-FRAND that it cannot trigger a duty to react? Each party should therefore have a duty to react to the other party’s
offer in a way that furthers negotiations. Also, each party should be obliged, regardless of the conduct of the other
party, to timely submit one binding licensing offer and bear the consequences (cf. below) if this offer is held by a court
or arbitration tribunal not to be FRAND.
 
Consequences of non-FRAND conduct:
The Huawei decision remains rather vague on what the exact consequences are when specific actions violate the standards
of good faith and recognised commercial conduct. Clearly, Huawei is not—and is not taken by Member States’ courts
to be—an injunction blocker but merely an injunction brake—injunctions remain possible if the standard implementer
does not behave appropriately. In addition, the implementer will have to pay damages for unlicensed use of the SEP. On
the other hand, patentees whose conduct violates FRAND should face severe retribution as well. Compulsory licensing,
defeat in court and a duty to bear the costs of unjustified injunction litigation are obvious sanctions, but implementers’
claims to damages suffered as a result of the patentee’s non-FRAND conduct may loom large as well.
 
The notion of "delay" regarding the implementer’s reaction:
The ECJ requires a "prompt" reaction by the standard implementer. In German this translates into "in kurzer Frist",
and in French into "bref délai". But how immediate must the implementer’s reaction be, given that it may be challenging
to assess validity, essentiality, infringement and FRAND conditions regarding the patents offered for licence? And does
every belated answer qualify as "delaying tactics" in the sense of Huawei? The Mannheim court’s timeframe of three
months is certainly at the rigorous end of the spectrum. In any case, a fixed period of time, be it three, six or eight
months, should not be more than a presumption which can be rebutted by showing particular complexity of the licensing
arrangement or other exceptional circumstances.
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Further conduct requirements of a "willing licensee":
A standard implementer is, of course, not a "willing licensee" if he refuses to take a licence entirely or at FRAND
conditions. Below this threshold, however, it is far from clear what conduct the implementer has to show in order to
qualify as "willing". Can, *374  for instance, the SEP holder request the implementer to sign a non-disclosure agreement
before entering into licensing negotiations? Can—as the Mannheim court seems to indicate—the patentee’s FRAND
offer envisage the taking of a worldwide licence although Huawei is binding law only for the European Union? And
is an implementer required to provide appropriate security in spite of the SEP holder’s offer (or, for that matter, both
offers) not being FRAND? 78  We think this is so but court guidance is still lacking. These and other details will keep
courts and lawyers busy for a while. And they constitute an area where proactive guidance by antitrust agencies and,
in particular, SSOs could be most beneficial.
 
Independent royalty determination:
When generously allowing for royalty determination "by an independent third party, by decision without delay", the
ECJ generates more questions than answers—who is to be the "independent" party? Where does the binding force of
its "decision" stem from? Is this decision really limited to royalties or can it determine all relevant licensing conditions
—in our view the only reasonable reading? 79  As to the "delay", when does the period of time necessary for rendering
a well-founded "determination" end and the "delay" begin? How can private parties (the SEP holder and the standard
implementer) force an adjudicating body to act "without delay"? And if they fail to do so, does a delay void the belated
FRAND determination? Or does the ECJ, after all, really mean—and fail to clearly express—that the parties’ request
needs to be made without delay? Furthermore, the permission for the parties to seek royalty determination does not mean
they are able to get such determination. To us it is not evident that, at present, fast and reliable FRAND determination
for large SEP portfolios (not for single or few patents!) is readily available. If this were true, would it alter the availability
of injunctions to the SEP holder 80  by making hold-out easier to prolong?
 
Claims other than injunctions:
The Huawei rules of good-faith conduct are expressly limited to injunctions, while the SEP holder may, according to
the ECJ, always seek damages. Future case law will have to show whether this approach proves viable or whether (some
of) the injunction-related conduct requirement will have to be transferred to the damages arena. After all, the seeking
of damages for a long-lasting and extensive (purported) infringement of an (alleged) SEP may serve to put considerable
pressure on a prospective licensee as well.
4. The importance of procedural tools and the role of SSOs
Some of the issues just described may be resolved by developing material rules of law that are both precise and
flexible enough to achieve, in most cases, appropriate results. To a certain extent, though, SEP cases are so complex,
heterogeneous and fact-sensitive that legal "formulae" of general applicability are hard to define or must remain vague.
Rules of law alone are, for instance, not well suited to determine the quality of a large portfolio of—alleged—SEPs.
Instead, detailed technical analysis is required whose outcome depends on the facts of the case. "FRAND" licensing
conditions—to name another and probably the most paramount example—are not the same for all SEPs, all standard-
based markets or all standard users. And even with regard to a single licensing relationship many commentators doubt
—with good reasons—whether there is any such thing as a precise FRAND-formula. 81  Hence FRAND, although a
core concept of SSO-standardisation and the ECJ’s "middle path", provides no more than shaky ground.
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However, where material rules fail, procedural tools may step in. Competent and impartial decision-making bodies,
applying appropriate procedural rules, may be able to solve even numerous and complex SEP controversies. Scholars
and practitioners should therefore have a focus on conceiving such bodies and procedures. State courts are an obvious,
and very valuable, player in the field. But their use is costly to the public. Their judges are oftentimes no experts with
regard to the standardised technologies or the standard-based markets. Fact finding in court can be cumbersome and
jurisdictional methods, such as extensive discovery and jury trials, onerous to the parties. Furthermore, state courts may
—for instance with regard to the quality and value of SEP portfolios—be *375  forestalled or hesitant to issue the kind
of rough-and-ready assessment that can be very helpful to industry participants but equally easy to appeal.
The limitations of state courts confronted with an onrush of complex SEP cases draw attention to the managers
and gatekeepers of standardisation, the standard-setting organisations. To what extent might they be arbiters in SEP
conflicts, for instance by establishing some form of SSO arbitration panel? Some characteristics of SSOs advocate
caution. The organisations are, for instance, not necessarily in a strong and unbiased position vis-à-vis (all) their
members. Big companies are important drivers of the standard-setting process and their post-implementation market
activity is indispensable for the standard’s success. This is not to mean that SSOs should do away with big business-
participation —standardisation would not work as well without it. But there is a risk that such powerful players shape
SSO rules according to their interests. 82  Regarding SSO-linked arbitration panels, one might argue that the market
player’s contradicting interests will somehow level out. In particular, since many companies are SEP holders and standard
users at the same time it is hard for them to foresee whether they will be the infringer or the patent-plaintiff in future
litigation. This may lead them to perceive their best interest in unbiased procedural rules and decision-making bodies.
When, however, one faction of SSO participants with a one-sided market position (users, NPEs) gains the upper hand
in the SSO or when the big players ally against smaller standard users, panel composition or panel rules may get twisted.
Taking a second example, the legal framework in which SSOs would play a new procedural role is yet to be defined.
SSOs are private entities, subject mainly to national laws whose applicability is to be determined by applying conflict
of laws-rules. 83  These national laws may not allow for court-like powers of private "associations" unless the parties
have subjected themselves to them by way of membership, arbitration agreement or the like. At the same time, the
standards SSOs set are oftentimes of transnational, even global impact. Hence, the decisions of SSO-tribunals can affect
companies and consumers who are neither SSO members nor consented to panel-powers of jurisdiction. At the very least,
this suggests a specific legal framework to which SSO-tribunals are bound and under which the legal essence of their
decisions (not necessarily business data) is accessible to the public, as well as subject to some form of impartial review.
This framework will also have to tackle many of the legal, economic and practical difficulties faced by state courts, such
as the cost and duration of litigation or the availability of competent decision makers. Existing SSO-based arbitration 84
probably fails to meet this challenge 85  since it does not seem to burgeon. 86
In spite of these and further concerns, it seems a promising idea to involve SSOs in handling the effects of standardisation.
As to FRAND determination, for instance, it could be useful to establish a division of labour between SSO-based
decision-making bodies and state courts—while the latter define the legal metes and bounds, such as the appropriate
basis for FRAND determination, SSOs could apply these rules to the facts of particular cases. Intensive discussion
and careful conceptual work is necessary, though, to mitigate the downsides of SSO empowerment. The organisations
themselves may be hesitant to assume a more active role. If need be and when the legal community is confident that
an appropriate legal framework has been developed, states and/or supranational structures (such as the EU) should
nonetheless be willing to force them into it.
IV. Conclusion
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In the uttermost distress the middle path does bring death 87 —contrary to Friedrich von Logau’s proverb standard-
setting and the EU law on SEPs are not in a state of emergency, nor is the Huawei ruling likely to have fatal consequences.
However, the ECJ’s "middle path" needs to get broader and more discernible in order not to become a slippery slope.
Important measures to that effect are a specification of the FRAND negotiation-process and of the sanctions for abusing
it, as well as the empowerment of rules and bodies which might help to find procedural solutions to the most intractable
SEP issues. The present contribution hopes to initiate further discourse on these issues. Because it is only if these and other
roadblocks are removed that standardisation will be able to make its full contribution to innovation and competition.
Peter Picht
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